

Stable matchings and matchings in general graphs

Lecture 16

An example:

Men $[w, x, y, z]$
 $w: c > b > a > d$
 $x: a > b > c > d$
 $y: a > c > b > d$
 $z: c > b > a > d$

Women $[a, b, c, d]$
 $a: z > x > y > w$
 $b: y > w > x > z$
 $c: w > x > y > z$
 $d: x > y > z > w.$

An *unstable pair* is such a matching M is a pair (x, y) with $x \in X$ and $y \in Y$ such that x is **not** married to y but likes y more than his wife and y likes x more than her husband.

A perfect matching in such $K_{n,n}$ with preference list is **stable**, if it has **no unstable pairs**.

Gale-Shapley Proposal Algorithm

Input: Preference rankings of men and women.

Goal: Find a stable matching.

Iteration: Each man proposes to the woman **highest in his list** among those who had not rejected him, yet.

If each woman receives exactly one proposal, then **Stop and output this matching.**

Otherwise, each woman says **"Maybe"** to the highest in her list proposer and **rejects other proposers**. Each man **deletes the woman rejecting him** from his list. Go to the next iteration.

Theorem 3.6 (Gale and Shapley, 1962): The above algorithm produces a **stable matching**.

Proof of Theorem 3.6

Observation 1: If a woman rejects somebody at least once, then she has a proposer till the very end, and the position of each next "Maybe" man in her list **can only grow**.

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Observation 2: No man is **rejected by all women**.

Observation 3: The algorithm **stops after at most n^2 rounds** and produces some perfect matching M .

Observation 4: The produced matching M **is stable**.

Indeed, suppose M **is not stable**. Then there is $x \in X$ and $a \in Y$ such that a is higher in the list of x than $M(x)$ and x is **higher in the list of a** than $M(a)$.

This means x proposed to a at some step(s), and at some Step j , a rejected him, because of a better proposer. But then by Observation 1, $M(a)$ is **higher in her list** than x . □

An example

Men [u, v, x, y, z]

$u: c > b > e > d > a$

$v: c > d > e > a > b$

$x: a > b > c > d > e$

$y: a > e > d > b > c$

$z: c > e > b > a > d$

Women [a, b, c, d, e]

$a: y > x > u > v > z$

$b: u > x > v > z > y$

$c: z > x > y > u > v$

$d: v > x > u > z > y$

$e: v > u > y > x > z.$

So, we have a polynomial-time algorithm for finding **some stable matching**.

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It could be proved that as a result of the above algorithm, **EVERY MAN** gets the **BEST** wife he can get in a stable matching.

Moreover, **EVERY WOMAN** gets the **WORST** husband she can get in a stable matching.

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Moreover, **EVERY WOMAN** gets the **WORST** husband she can get in a stable matching.

This algorithm is used to assign the graduates of American **medical schools** as residents at hospitals over the country.

Matchings in general graphs

For $k \geq 1$, a k -factor in a graph G is a spanning k -regular subgraph of G .

An **odd component** of a graph G is a component with an odd number of vertices, and $o(G)$ denotes the number odd components of G

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It turned out that the number of odd components of subgraphs of G is important for the existence of perfect matchings in G .

For example, if G has an odd component, then G has no p.m. Similarly, if G has a set S of vertices s.t. $G - S$ has more than $|S|$ odd components, then again G has no p.m.

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The importance of the above observation follows from the famous **Tutte's Theorem**.

Theorem 3.7 (Tutte, 1947): A graph G has a p.m. if and only if

$$o(G - S) \leq |S| \quad \forall S \subseteq V(G). \quad (1)$$

Proof. The "only if" part is easy. We prove the "if" part.
If this part does not hold for n -vertex simple graphs, then there is an n -vertex simple graph G satisfying (1) and no p.m. with the most edges.

Since adding an edge to G preserves (1), any such adding leads to a graph with a p.m.

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Let U be the set of vertices in G of degree $n - 1$.

Case 1: All components of $G - U$ are complete graphs. Since by (1), $o(G - U) \leq |U|$, we construct a p.m. by hand.

Case 2: Some component G' of $G - U$ is **not a complete graph**.
Then G' contains an **induced path P_3** , say with vertices x, y and z (in this order).

Since $y \notin U$, **there is $w \in V(G) - N(y)$** .

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Let $e_1 = xz$, $e_2 = wy$. Let $G_i = G + e_i$. Then for $i = 1, 2$, G_i **contains a p.m. M_i** .

Furthermore, $e_1 \in M_1 - M_2$ and $e_2 \in M_2 - M_1$.

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Furthermore, $e_1 \in M_1 - M_2$ and $e_2 \in M_2 - M_1$.

Consider the graph F with **edge set $M_1 \cup M_2$** . By definition, $\Delta(F) = 2$, and every component is either an edge (belonging to both, M_1 and M_2) or a cycle whose edges **alternately belong to M_1 and M_2** .

Let C_i be **the cycle in F containing e_i** .

Case 2.1: $C_2 \neq C_1$. Then we define a **new perfect matching** in F :

$$M = (M_1 - (M_1 \cap E(C_1))) \cup (M_2 \cap E(C_1)).$$


This M **contains neither e_1 nor e_2** . Hence it is a p.m. in G , a contradiction.

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Case 2.2: $C_2 = C_1$.



Let Q_1 be the x, y -path in $C_1 - xz$ and Q_2 be the z, y -path in $C_1 - xz$

By symmetry, we may assume that $wy \in E(Q_1)$. Let M_0 be obtained from M_1 by deleting the edges in $M_1 \cap Q_2$ and adding edge xy and all edges in $M_2 \cap Q_2$.

Then M_0 covers all vertices of G and contains neither e_1 nor e_2 . This contradiction proves the theorem. \square